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June 9, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE 88635 
.;"""fhe PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 
objection. it is so ordered. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, what 
I am about to say has no personal impli-
cations for the President. for any Mem-
ber of this body. or for anyone who may 
disagree with my remarks. I thought tha.t 
the President. April 20 last. did an excel-
lent job in quieting the doubts and fears 
of the American people and. a.t the same 
time. raising our hopes on the basis of 
his prf'viously announced and further 
announced withdrawals of U.S. troops 
from Vietnam. Even the campuses were 
relatively quiet and seemed to be willing 
to give support to the President's phased 
withdrawal policy. 
Since that time a number of things 
have happened which have caused a 
change in attitude. a change in climate, 
and have brought about a division among 
our people. a polarization in the Nation, 
and a. guli between young anct old, black 
and white. hawks and doves 
It has not been helpfUl to know that 
the economy has stfa.dily deteriorated. 
It has not been helpfUl to know o! the 
stock marke~ convulsion. even after a 
partial recovery which was a result. I 
am sure. of a meeting which President 
Nixon had with a sizable number of 
America...'1. businessmen. 
Since that time. also. t..J.:ie President ha.s 
hailed military gains in Cambodia-and 
rightly- but critics have feared that what 
he did in Cambodia will expand. enlarge, 
and accelerate the war rather than 
~;horten it. 
Then, of course, there are those who 
feel that the President, before he made 
this precipitate move. should have con-
sulted with Members of Congress, not 
necessarily v.ith the Democratic Mem-
bers, although that is alwayG appreciated. 
but primarily and sp-ecifically with his 
own leaders in the House and the Senate, 
so that there could have been some show 
of consultation before the move was 
made. 
The Cambodian adventure-and that 
is what it is-has rarsed questions: What 
is going to happen to the South Viet-
namese who remain L'1 Cambodia. R.fter 
the first of next month? What will be 
the policy of this count!"'J insofar as 
bombing Cambodia is concerned after 
the fust of next month? What will be 
our concepts, after the capture of huge 
enemy supply dumps and the like, as tc 
what Peking and Moscow will do in the 
way of replenishing the mater: a! that has 
been captured. lost. or destroyed'? 
What about the que.<.tions which have 
be<>n raised with regard to the omcia'. 
explanations? Was it a fo:-ay to p1.uLsh 
&."1 enemy threat as i."ldicated by Pres!-
dent Nixon on April 30, or was it to seize 
a milltary "opportunity," as stated by 
Secretary of Defense Laird on May 13, 
around the time, I believe he said that, 
when the invasion of Cambodia took 
place, the Vietcong and the North Viet-
namese forces had already retreated 15 
miles to the west? 
What forces were concentrating on the 
Cambodian border at that time in the 
Cambodian sanctuaries? 
What forces were actually moving out 
of them? 
All of these developments and ques-
tions serve as a. prelude to the rise of a 
deep feeling of concern which many of 
us feel. I know that the same concern is 
felt by those who uphold the pending 
business, the Byrd-Grillln amendment, 
as t hose who oppose it. 
So, I want it very clearly understood 
that I will not be a party to divisiveness 
in this country. I Will do nothing to bring 
about a polarization in this country. I 
will explain my views. take my stands, 
and assume my responsibilities. That is 
a part of the duty of any Senator. re-
gardless of how we look at the situation 
which confronts all of us today· I re-
peat--regardless of our views. 
Mr. President, it is not for me to ques-
tion any Senator's motive with respect 
to the Cooper-Church amendment. Each 
Senator will determine his own position 
on this legislation. I would merely ex-
press the hope that we will oo able to 
dispose of the entire matter in the near 
future. With the cooperation of the Sen-
ator from Michigan (Mr. GRIITIN) there 
is now agreement to vote. Thursday, on 
the Byrd-Griffin modification. With his 
further cooperation. perhaps, some ac-
cord might soon be reached to bring the 
Cooper-Church question to a close. 
The Senate should face up to this mat-
ter without further delay because what 
began as a debate has shifted to an ex-
tended discussion and for some days has 
verged on a filibuster. It hardly reflects 
credit on the Senate to obfuscate the 
question by prolonged resort to the in-
dulgent procedures of the Senate rules. 
The issue wi..ll not go away, no matter 
how long it may be debated. It will not 
be swept aside, whether the Cambodian 
adventure is held to be a military suc-
cess or a failure. It will not be laid to 
rest in the Senate because it cannot be 
laid to rest in our consciences. 
As long as Americans continue to die 
in this misbegotten involvement in Indo-
china, the issue will remain alive. It will 
be v.ith us on June 30 and after June 30. 
There is no escaping it, whether 30,000 
Americans remain in Cambodia. 300, 
three. or none. More is involved here 
than another m1l!tary sortie into Cam-
bodia, a military sortie which. inciden-
tally, has already cost well over a thou-
sand additional American casualties in 
this new theater of war. 
Beyond military success or failure, the 
issue posec by Cooper-Church is funda-
mental. For too long, we have skated the 
thin 1Ce of constitutional expediency in 
matters of vro.r and peac.e. For too long, 
the Senate has shrouded its constitu-
tional responsibilities in the skirts of 
Presidential authority 
To be sure, it has been easier to say: 
"Leave it to the Commander in Chief" or 
"trust the Commander in Chief," or 
"blame the Commander in Chief." When 
all has been sa.id, however, there is stlll 
the involvement in Vietnam. There is 
still the involvement in Laos. There is 
stlll the involvement in Cambodia. There 
is still the ever-rising level of dead and 
wounded young Americans in Indochina, 
a level which now stands at 330,000. 
There are still the haunting questions : 
"What for? Why?" 
I ask these questions, now not of Presi-
dent Nixon or of his predecessors. Rather, 
I ask them of the Senate and of myself 
as one Senator. Since World War II, 
Presidents have exercised the powers of 
the Presidency, explicit, assumed or dele-
gated, as they have seen fit. On entering 
omce each has found that the executive 
branch is a repository of an awesome in-
heritance of overseas commitments. A 
President cannot escape these commit-
ments or evade them because they were 
collected under his predecessors. He must 
face them. He must act on them in the 
best interests of the Nation as he comes 
to see those interests. In turn, he leaves 
a modified but continuing set of commit-
ments to his successor. 
I do not speak with rancor of the Pres-
ident's exercise of his responsib1lities in 
this connecti'On. Rather, I SJ)eak in all 
humility and with some regret of the 
manner in which we have perceived and 
acted on pur responsibilities as a Senate 
with regard to Southeast Asia. 
To be sure, the Senate's intentions 
have been of the best. For many years, 
we have seen our role in matters of war 
and pea.ce largely as one of acquiescence 
in the a.cts of the executive branch. If we 
have had doubts, we have swallowed 
them. Since President Eisenhower's ad-
ministration. at least, we have time. and 
again deferred to the executive branch 
in international matters. The executive 
branch has presented us with decisions. 
We have gone along. We have rocked few 
boats. 
That is the explanation of hundreds of 
billions of dollars of defense asppropria-
tions little debated in this body for 15 or 
more years. That is the sound of various 
Senate declarations of support of Presi-
dential actions abroad, sometimes even 
before the actions were taken. We have 
proceeded in the name of national unity 
and in the language of nonpartisanship. 
In the presumed pursuit of security, not 
only politics but the exercise of the sepa-
rate constitutional powers of the Senate 
has stopped at the water's edge. 
That is the eJCplanatlon of the Tonkin 
Gulf resolution of 1964. In that act, the 
Senate ioined the House in deferring to 
the President Then, too, the Senate gave 
assent to what the Executive had done, 
was doing. and might do in the future in 
the way of committing the Nation's 
Aimed Forces in Vietnam. 
Why did we do it? WhY did the Sen-
ate adopt the Tonkin Gulf resolution 
in short order and with only two dis-
senting votes? Were we fearful of ex-
ercising -an independent judgment? Was 
it because we accepted assurances that 
we were strengthening the hand of the 
President in protecting American forces 
already m Vietnam? Were we persuaded 
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that a. show or unity here would secure 
freedom in South Vietnam? Were we 
convinced that what was tantamount to 
a post-dated declar!lltion of war would 
so frighten the North Vietnamese as to 
forestall the further spread of the war 
and, hence, our deepening involvement? 
Such were the reasons for the Tonkin 
Gulf resolution thS,t were propounded 
at the time. Such were the judgments of 
the executive branch. That was almost 6 
years ago. The Senate passed the Ton-
kin Gulf resolution. The Senate acted, 
we thought, to protect American serv-
icemen alrea.dy in Vietnam. The Senate 
gave the green light to go further into 
Vietnam in order the more quickly, we 
thought, to withdraw from Vietnam. 
The rest is history. 
In August, 1964, there were less than 
20,000 U.S. servicemen in Indochina. To-
day there are upwards of 425,000 and 
under the previous administration the 
total rose to well over 500,000. In the 
11 years before the Tonkin Gulf resolu-
tion, our casualties were less than 200 
Americans killed-20 a year-in re-
trospect, even that was far too many-
in Vletna.m. In the 6 years ~ince, 50,000 
have died in Indoehi.nar-almost 9,000 a 
year. 
Six years ago the U.S. milltary pres-
ence was confined largely to Saigon and 
a few coastal Vietnamese cities. The U.S. 
involvement was still i.ndirect and pe-
ripheral. Now 6 years after the Tonkin 
Gulf resolution, U.S. servicemen are scat-
tered through Vietnam. Laos. Thailand, 
and Cambodia. The invo vement is direct 
and, notwithstanding thP so-called Viet-
namization program, it is central to the 
entire structurP of the war in Indochina. 
I do not recaJ~ this history without a 
painful awar~"nE'~< of the Senate's part in 
its '.\oTiting ~,r,- "t must be recalled. 
It must be reca'1.e6. because the Senate is, 
again, face to •arP with another Tonkin 
Gul:: resolution I refer +..o the Byrd-
Griffin modification wl-ich is now pend-
ing to the Cooper-Church amendment. 
Once again, the Senate is asked, in 
effect. to accept what the executive 
branch has done, what i>t is doing, and 
what it may do with regard to Cambodia. 
That is the price the Senate is quoted 
if we would retain even a promise of pre-
venting the further spread of the war 
under the CQoper-Church amendment. 
We are asked by the Byrd-Griffin moctm-
cation to give legal endorsement to what-
ever course may be set by the executive 
branch in Cambodia. We are asked to 
subscribe not only to what is done in 
Cambodia in the name of the Com-
mander in Chief under this President 
but, if the war persists, under his suc-
cessor, whomever he may be and, per-
haps, his successor·s ~uccessor. 
That is the nub of the Byrd-Grimn 
modification. :rt would establish for the 
Cambodian policies of t.~e ~xecutive 
branch the same legal basis that the 
Tonkin Gulf resolutic :>. fashioned for the 
Vietnamese involvement 6 :ong years ago. 
The Byrd-Griffin modification says that 
Cooper-Church wili not a.pply unless the 
executive branch decrees that it should 
apply, Under Byrd-Griffin, the statutory 
wall of Cooper-Church against the 
spread of our involvement into Cambodia 
stands or falls on a word from the White 
House. 
Let the executive branch affirm that 
what it does in Cambodia is for the pur-
pose of protecting our forces in Vietnam. 
Let the executive branch assert that what 
it does in Cambodia is to facilitate the 
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam. 
Let either be said by the executive branch 
at any time and the Cooper-Church lim-
itations are nul.lified. No matter that the 
Senate is not consulted. No matter that 
the Congress is ignored. No matter how 
long U.S. forces remain in Cambodia, no 
matter how many Americans may die in 
Cambodia, no matter how many more 
billions are spent in compounding tlle 
tragedy of Vietnam, it will all be done 
with the legal sanction of the Senate. 
I know that the authors of the Byrd-
Griffin modification do not expect the 
modification to work in that fashion. I 
know that the Senator from West Vir-
ginia and the Senator from Michigan 
want not to prolong but to end the in-
volvement in Cjj.mbodia. They want to 
protect American servicemen in Viet-
nam, not jeopardize others in C!limbodia. 
That is what we all want. 
Is it not what we wanted-all of us--
when we passed the Tonkin Gulf res-
olution 6 years ago? 
The Byrd-Griffin modification is a di-
rect descendant of the Tonkin Gulf res-
olution. The clay carries the same im-
print. The door to fUrther involvement 
.in Cambodia is not closed by Byrd-
Griffin. Byrd-Gritll.n opens the door 
wider. It sanctions an in-and-out en-
tanglement in Cambodia. It sanctions 
a direct or indirect entrapment in Cam-
bodia. It sanctions an ad infinitum in-
volvement in Cambodia even as the Ton-
kin Gulf resolution did the same for the 
open-ended involvement in V1etnam. 
Byrd-Griffl.n lifts the Congressional 
counterweights which Cooper-Church 
seeks to place against the pressures for 
expanding mvolvement in Indochina. It 
shackles the Senate's responsibility to 
join Its separate constitutional authority 
with that o! the President l.n a common 
effort to confine the war and withdraw 
U.S. forces. 
If Byrd-Grtmn is adopted on Thursday 
next, let there be no Monday mornjng 
regrets. Let there be no shocked indig-
nation later. Whatever our intent, we 
will have cleared the way for another 
Vietnam in Cambodia :mci, perhaps, for 
still others elsewhere. The time to face 
the implications of Byrd-Griffin is now. 
It is not next yea.r or thE' yea.r after. 
Six years of tragic afteriT'..e.:'" tc the 
Tonkin Gulf resolution flags t.hc warn-
ing. We cannot consign the Senate's 
constitutional responsibilities 1n matters 
of war and peace. We crumot transfer 
them to the executive branch under this 
President or any other We cannot take 
refuge from them without doing funda-
mental violence to the Constitution and 
endanger the stability of the Re-
public. 
The Senate can work with a President 
within the constitutional framework in 
matters of war an.d peace. It can work 
with this President or another But the 
Senate cannot and must not work for 
any President. regardless of party con-
siderations. in matters of war and peace. 
I t is not a question of supporting or op-
posing the President. It is a question 
of fulfilling our separate constitutional 
obligations. 
I am aware that the President has ex-
pressed some sort of unofficia.l endorse-
ment of the pending modification. The 
White House has written a letter. That 
is the President's right and his com-
ments--solicited or unsolicited--deserve 
the most careful consideration of · the 
Senate. Let us be clear. however, on one 
point. The President's constitutional re-
sponsibility in this matter does not begin 
at this time. His constitutional responsi-
bility is not activated unless and until 
this legislation has passed, not only the 
Senate but also the House. Then and 
only then does the measure become sub-
ject to the Presdent's approval or rejec-
tion. Then and only then does it become 
the Constitutional business of the 
President. 
Now it is the Senate's responsibility. 
Now, the disposition of the Byrd-Griffin 
modification is a. matter for the Senate 
alone. We have had the President's letter. 
We have also ha« citizens' letters, by the 
hundreds of thousands. We have had 
lobbying and lectures. That is appro-
priate and proper. But the obligation 
now-the oonstitutional obligation-is 
for the Senate alone. for 100 Senators. 
May I say that contrary to a great 
camouflage of words, the Cooper-Church 
amendment is not an indication of lack 
of confidence in the President. The m.ir-
age of current gossip, notwithstanding, 
Cooper-Church throws down no Senate 
gauntlet to the constitutional powers of 
the Presidency. If that were its intent, I 
assure the Senate that I would have no 
part of it. I have too much respect for the 
office of the Presidency, too much con-
cern for its occupant, whomever he may 
be, whatever his party. 
Cooper-Church is not aimed at this 
President or any other. Rather, Cooper-
Church would strengthen the joint con-
trol of the elected representatives of this 
Nation-of the President and the Con-
gress-over the far-flung activities of 
this Government in Southeast Asia 
which for too long have veered too close 
to the edge of irresponsibility. Cooper-
Church would add the strength of the 
war powers of the Congress under the 
Constitution to the President's constitu-
tional powers as Commander in Chief. 
Cooper-Church would provide not a 
rebuff but a recourse for the President. It 
would require, henceforth, that the ad-
vice of the continuing counsellors in the 
executive branch shall be weighed in the 
scales of responsible congressional con-
sideration before critical new commit-
ments are undertaken in the name of this 
Nation. 
In that sense Cooper-Church might or-
fer an antidote to any tendencies to ir-
responsibility in government in all of it.s 
agencies. Hopefully, it m,ight raise a stop-
look-and-listen to discourage the launch-
ing of impetuous or precipitous adven-
tures abroad which, in the end, affect 
deeply the lives of millions of people 
and jeopardize the welfare of the Re-
public. 
I say "might'' Mr. President, because 
the hour is late, very late. 
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We have spilled too much of the Na-
tion's young blood In a wasting and mis-
taken war In Indochina. We have spent 
too much of the Nation's strength In allen · 
lands for an ill-starred purpose. We have 
thought too much of sav.lng face an(l. 
not enough of saving lives. All the while, 
the troubles within our own borders have 
multiplied. All the while, fiashes of new 
dangers streak across other horizons. All 
the while the Nation remains bound in 
Southeast Asia where fundamental .Inter-
ests are not engaged but great na'tiona.l 
resources disappear In an endless fiow. 
The hour Is late, very late. 
The Byrd-Grlffi.n modification, In my 
judgment, Is the critical vote of this Is-
sue. Reject it and the Senate will say that 
the way out of Vietnam is not by way of 
Cambodia. Adopt Byrd-Grimn to 
Cooper-Church and the Senate will still 
say that the way out of VIetnam Is not 
by way of Cambodia, but only if the exec-
utive branch also says the same thing. 
The constitutional message of Cooper-
Church without this proposed addition· is 
clear. The Senate acts In concert with 
the President's expressed determination 
but under its own legal responsiblllty in 
an etrort to curb the further expansion 
of the war In Indochina. The Byrd-Grif-
fin modification clouds that message. 
In my judgment, the Senate should 
keep the Cooper-Church amendment 
free of distortion. The credlbtlity of the 
Senate demands it. The urgencies of the 
..Nation require it. 
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